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This is an appeal under the formal procedure pursuant to 
G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal 
of the Board of Assessors of the City of Everett (“assessors” or 
“appellee”) to abate a fiscal year 2016 (“fiscal year at issue”) 
tax on real estate located in the City of Everett, owned by 
Mr. Faissal Daaboul, and occupied by the lessee RD Donut II, 
Inc. (“appellant”).1  
Commissioner Rose (“Presiding Commissioner”) heard this 
appeal under G.L. c. 58A, § 1A and 831 CMR 1.20 and issued a 
single-member decision for the appellee.  
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a 
request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 
1.32. 
 
John Angiolillo, pro se, for the appellant. 
 
Bernard Devereux, assessor, for the appellee. 
 
                                                 
1 As a tenant under an obligation to pay more than one-half of the 
taxes assessed, the appellant has standing to prosecute this appeal. 
See G.L. c. 59, § 59. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
 
 On the basis of the testimony and exhibits offered into 
evidence at the hearing of this appeal, the Presiding 
Commissioner made the following findings of fact. 
On January 1, 2015, the relevant valuation and assessment 
date for the fiscal year at issue, the appellant was a tenant 
responsible for the payment of taxes under a 10-year, triple-net 
lease. The parcel is a 5,847-square-foot parcel of real estate 
improved with a Dunkin’ Donuts franchise consisting of 1,154 
square feet and located at 339 Main Street in Everett (“subject 
property”).  
For the fiscal year at issue, the assessors valued the 
subject property at $624,400 and assessed a tax thereon, at the 
rate of $37.98 per thousand, in the total amount of $23,714.71.  
On December 31, 2015, Everett’s Collector of Taxes sent out the 
actual real estate tax bills for the fiscal year at issue. In 
accordance with G. L. c. 59, § 57C, the appellant timely paid 
the tax due without incurring interest.  On January 28, 2016, in 
accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the appellant timely filed an 
application for abatement with the assessors, which they denied 
on March 7, 2016. On May 2, 2016, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, 
§§ 64 and 65, the appellant seasonably filed an appeal with the 
Appellate Tax Board (“Board”). On the basis of these facts, the 
ATB 2018-461 
 
Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the Board had 
jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant appeal. 
At the hearing of this appeal, John Angiolillo testified on 
behalf of the appellant. He supported his claim that the subject 
property was overvalued by using 5 analyses: (1) a comparable 
sales approach prepared by a realtor; (2) an income approach; 
(3) a “market value” approach; (4) a cost approach; and (5) a 
comparable assessment approach.   
Regarding the comparable sales approach, the realtor who 
prepared the analysis did not testify at the hearing of this 
appeal.  She used 2 mixed-use properties that had not yet sold 
and 2 others that had sold.  There was no evidence offered as to 
the comparability of these properties with the subject property, 
and no adjustments made to the sale prices of the 2 properties 
that sold.  Because the realtor who prepared the analysis did 
not testify, as well as the above defects in the analysis, the 
Presiding Commissioner gave no weight to the comparable sales 
approach. 
For his income approach, Mr. Angiolillo used the current 
rent and expenses that the appellant paid at the subject 
property, and a capitalization rate of 8.5 percent that 
“appraisers . . . are currently using . . . for this type of 
property.”  There was no evidence that the current rent and 
expenses paid under the long-term lease at the subject property 
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represented market rent and expenses and no support for the 
capitalization rate that Mr. Angiolillo used. Moreover, 
Mr. Angiolillo is not a real estate valuation expert and he was 
not qualified as such by the Presiding Commissioner.  
Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner did not give weight to 
Mr. Angiolillo’s income approach. 
Mr. Angiolillo also offered an analysis that he called a 
“market value” approach.  He began by suggesting, without 
supporting data, that the retail rent for space similar 
to the subject property would be between $25.00 and $35.00-per-
square-foot. Assuming the $35.00 per square foot rent, the 
annual rent would be approximately $40,000 per year. Deducting 
the current real estate tax assessment of approximately $24,000 
leaves a net income of $16,000, which he then capitalized at an 
overall rate of 8.5 percent to arrive at a building value that 
even he believed was too low.  He then testified that a building 
value of $306,000 would be more reasonable, which he calculated 
based upon his own suggested tax value of $14,000.  The 
Presiding Commissioner rejected this approach for a number of 
reasons, including: (1) the suggested rent and capitalization 
rates were not supported by market data or competent analysis; 
and (2) backing in to the fair market value by opining what the 
taxes should have been is not an appropriate or reliable method 
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of valuing the subject property.  Accordingly, the Presiding 
Commissioner gave this approach no weight. 
For his cost approach, Mr. Angiolillo testified that the 
assessed building value at $431,000 equates to $373.00 per 
square foot for the 1,154-square-foot building.  He further 
testified that in 2012, he razed the former building on the site 
and built the current structure at a cost of approximately 
$230,000, or $200 per square foot.  By adding this cost to the 
assessed value of the land, Mr. Angiolillo concluded that the 
subject property should be valued at $413,000.  The Presiding 
Commissioner rejected this approach because, among other 
reasons: no supporting documents corroborating the claimed costs 
to construct were offered into evidence; there was no support or 
even allegation that the actual costs represented market costs 
to construct the subject property; there was no evidence of the 
extent to which portions of the former structure – such as 
foundation, utilities, and framing – were retained as part of 
the new construction; and there was no indication that a cost 
approach is a reliable indicator of value for this type of 
income-producing retail space. Accordingly, the Presiding 
Commissioner afforded no weight to Mr. Angiolillo’s cost 
approach.  
Finally, Mr. Angiolillo made an argument based on the 
assessments of 2 other Dunkin’ Donuts properties in Everett, 
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located at 893 Broadway and 520 Broadway.  Because the 893 
Broadway Dunkin’ Donuts has over twice the lot size and finished 
building area than the subject property, Mr. Angiolillo believed 
that the subject property’s assessment should be one-half the 
assessment of 893 Broadway.  Similarly, because the Dunkin’ 
Donuts at 520 Broadway had 3 times the area of the subject 
property, he maintained that the subject property’s assessment 
should be one-third the assessment of 520 Broadway.  The 
Presiding Commissioner rejected this analysis because there is 
no indication that the market value of the properties have such 
a direct, proportional relationship to building area.  The value 
of these income-producing properties is based on their earning 
capacities and there was no evidence that the income is directly 
or proportionally related to the size of the facility. 
 The assessors for their part offered limited testimony by 
Bernard Devereux, assessor, who submitted an exhibit regarding 
capitalization rates of fast food franchises, including Dunkin’ 
Donuts, showing capitalization rates for Dunkin’ Donuts 
franchises of slightly over 6 percent for the relevant time 
periods. 
After considering all of the evidence, the Presiding 
Commissioner ultimately found that the appellant did not meet 
its burden of demonstrating that the subject property’s 
assessment exceeded its fair cash value for the fiscal year at 
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issue.  As detailed above, none of Mr. Angiolillo’s valuation 
methodologies constituted credible, persuasive evidence of 
overvaluation.  The most appropriate method to value the subject 
property would have been a properly conducted capitalization-of- 
income analysis.  However, Mr. Angiolillo’s income approach was 
flawed because there was insufficient evidence of market rents 
and expenses, and no support for the capitalization rate that he 
chose.   
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing findings of 
fact, the Presiding Commissioner issued a decision for the 
appellee in this appeal.   
  
       OPINION 
Assessors are required to assess real estate at its “fair 
cash value.”  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as 
the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will 
agree if both of them are fully informed and under no 
compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 
549, 566 (1956).   
Generally, the burden of proof is upon the taxpayer to 
prove that the subject property has a lower value than that 
assessed.  Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 
243, 245 (1974) (citing Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)).  The assessment is 
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presumed valid until the taxpayer sustains its burden of proving 
otherwise.  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 
591, 598 (1984) (quoting Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245).   
In order to determine a property’s fair cash value, its 
highest and best use must first be ascertained. See Peterson v. 
Assessors of Boston, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 429 (2004). In the 
present appeal, the subject property’s actual use was as a fast-
food restaurant.  The parties did not dispute that the subject 
property’s current use was its highest and best use, nor was 
there any evidence to the contrary in the record.  Accordingly, 
the Presiding Commissioner concluded that the subject property’s 
continued use as a fast-food restaurant was its highest and best 
use.   
Real estate valuation experts, the Massachusetts courts, 
and this Board generally rely upon three approaches to determine 
the fair cash value of property: income capitalization, sales 
comparison, and cost reproduction.  Correia v. New Bedford 
Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).  However, 
“[t]he introduction of evidence concerning the value based on 
[cost] computations has been limited to special situations in 
which data cannot be reliably computed under the other two 
methods.” Id. In the instant appeal, the Presiding Commissioner 
determined that the most appropriate method of valuing the 
subject property was the capitalization-of-income method. The 
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appellant provided no information as to why the cost approach 
would more accurately reflect the subject property’s value, 
especially when there was nothing unique or special to warrant 
the use of the cost approach over the traditional 
capitalization-of-income approach. 
The use of the income-capitalization approach is 
appropriate when reliable market-sales data are not available.  
Assessors of Weymouth v. Tammy Brook Co., 368 Mass. 810, 811 
(1975); Assessors of Lynnfield v. New England Oyster House, 
362 Mass. 696, 701-02 (1972); Assessors of Quincy v. Boston 
Consolidated Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 67 (1941).  It is also 
recognized as an appropriate technique to use for valuing 
income-producing property.  Taunton Redevelopment Assocs. v. 
Assessors of Taunton, 393 Mass. 293, 295 (1984).  Because the 
subject property was an income-producing property, the Presiding 
Commissioner found and ruled that the income-capitalization 
approach was the most reliable methodology with which to 
determine its fair cash value.  
The capitalization of income method analyzes the property's 
capacity to generate income over a 1-year period and converts 
the capacity into an indication of fair cash value by 
capitalizing the income at a rate determined to be appropriate 
for the investment risk involved.  See Olympia & York v. 
Assessors of Boston, 428 Mass. 236, 239 (1998).  When performing 
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a fee-simple valuation using a capitalization of income 
approach, the income stream used must reflect the property’s 
earning capacity or market rental value.  Pepsi-Cola Bottling 
Co., 397 Mass. 447, 451 (1986).  Using actual income figures may 
be acceptable, as long as they reflect market rents for the 
particular type of property involved.  Id.; see also Carye v. 
Assessors of Chelmsford, 394 Mass. 1001 (1985) (affirming the 
Board’s use of actual rents for valuation because there was 
substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s 
conclusion that actual rents were an adequate measure of the 
earning capacity of the real estate at issue in that appeal).  
Similarly, the expenses, allowances, and fees deducted should 
mirror the market.  Olympia & York, 428 Mass. at 239. In the 
present appeal, the Presiding Commissioner found that 
Mr. Angiolillo did not verify or test his use of actual income 
and expenses from the fourth year of his 10-year lease with the 
market and he failed to utilize market data in selecting his 
expense deductions. These failures rendered the reliability and 
probative value of his selections tenuous at best.   
The capitalization rate selected for use in an income-
capitalization methodology should consider the return necessary 
to attract investment capital.  Taunton Redevelopment Assocs., 
393 Mass. at 295.  The assumptions and information used to 
develop a capitalization rate should be market based.  APPRAISAL 
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INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 499-500 (13th ed. 2008) (“Direct 
capitalization employs capitalization rates . . . extracted from 
market data” and “processes a single year’s income into an 
indication of value . . . to produce a supportable indication of 
value when based on relevant market information.”).  In the 
present appeal, the Presiding Commissioner found that 
Mr. Angiolillo did not properly support or provide adequate 
foundation for the assumptions upon which he relied in 
developing his capitalization rate, nor was he qualified to do 
so.   
The Presiding Commissioner also found and ruled that the 
sheer number of failures and shortcomings associated with 
Mr. Angiolillo’s methodology further served to diminish its 
probative value.   See May Department Store Co. v. Assessors of 
Newton, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2009-153, 193 
(finding and ruling that the probative value of a real estate 
valuation expert’s testimony and report “collapsed under the 
weight of his numerous errors, omissions, and inconsistencies”).      
The mere production of evidence is not enough to meet the 
taxpayer’s burden of proving overvaluation; the evidence must be 
credible and persuasive.  See Foxboro Assocs. v. Board of 
Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 691 (1982).  As a 
consequence of Mr. Angiolillo’s omissions and failures, the 
Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the values derived 
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from his various valuation methodologies were not reliable, 
credible, or persuasive indicators of the subject property’s 
fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue.  
In reaching his decision in this appeal, the Presiding 
Commissioner was not required to believe the testimony of any 
particular witness or adopt any particular method of valuation 
that a witness suggested.  Rather, he could accept those 
portions of the evidence that he determined had more convincing 
weight.  Foxboro Assocs., 385 Mass. at 683; New Boston Garden 
Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 473 (1981); New 
England Oyster House, 362 Mass. at 701-02.  “The credibility of 
witnesses, the weight of evidence, the inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence are matters for the board.”  Cummington School 
of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 605 
(1977).  Furthermore, the Presiding Commissioner may disbelieve 
a witness or reject evidence as long as he has an “‘explicit and 
objectively adequate reason.’”  New Boston Garden Corp., 
383 Mass. at 470-71.  
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On this basis, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled 
that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the subject 
property’s assessment exceeded its fair cash value for the 
fiscal year at issue.  The Presiding Commissioner, therefore, 
decided this appeal for the appellee. 
 




      By:    ________     
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